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“A remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.”2

INTRODUCTION
Not getting access to appropriate medication violates
the Eighth Amendment. Opioid use disorder (OUD) is covered
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which
requires access to services, such as medication, that is in
connection with drug rehabilitation. Therefore, even if there are
loopholes under the Eighth Amendment, the ADA tightly
restricts those by requiring correctional facilities to provide
medication-assisted treatment (MAT) to qualified individuals.
A willfully ignorant administrative authority should not have
the power to decide on someone’s health care, especially when
such a decision is influenced by deeply ingrained stigma. The
American Bar Association (ABA) Standards, as well as case law,
continue to find that only a qualified medical professional
should be allowed to make these types of health decisions.
Although courts have begun to enforce compliance with the
Eighth Amendment, ADA, and ABA Standards, correctional
facilities continue to prohibit access to MAT through various
loopholes; therefore, this article proposes that courts find a
constitutional right to MAT to ensure compliance among
correctional facilities.
The proposal offered here works for three reasons. First,
as a constitutional matter; the Eighth Amendment requires that
incarcerated individuals receive medical attention when there
is a serious medical need. By mandating that correctional
facilities provide MAT, correctional facilities would then be
complying with the constitution. Second, from a human rights
perspective; by providing MAT to incarcerated individuals,
correctional facilities are providing adequate protections to
marginalized individuals who experience various types of
discrimination based on their disability. Third, it is more likely
to change the stigma that is deeply embedded in our society. If
correctional facilities have to provide MAT to incarcerated
individuals, their preconceived notions could be eradicated
2

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).
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because they will observe first-hand that MAT decreases
recidivism and poses no security issue. This, in addition to the
decrease in substance abuse and recidivism, could shift
society’s views of people with substance abuse disorders and
result in more equal rights.
Part I will provide background as to why opioid use
disorder should be addressed in correctional facilities. Part II
will explore the constitutional right to receive appropriate
treatment despite being incarcerated, as well as explore
statutory guidelines within the ADA and suggestions made by
the ABA. Part III will compare state policies to demonstrate
how states have begun to make systemic changes and will
discuss which approaches have been successful. This comment
concludes by offering solutions on how to ensure constitutional
compliance among correctional facilities in a way that serves
the incarcerated individual’s best medical interest.

PART I: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES
While the incarceration rate in the United States is
starting to decline, there are almost 2.3 million people confined,
making the United States one of the countries with the highest
incarceration rate.3 Nearly 65% of individuals in correctional
facilities have a substance use disorder.4 This does not account
for the people in the general population who have an opioid use
disorder. In 2017, 2.1 million people in the United States had an
opioid use disorder.5 Over 70,000 drug deaths occurred in 2017,
which is a 9.6% increase from 2016.6 Opioids were involved in

Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie
2019, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.
.
4 Medication-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder in the Justice
System, AM. ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF OPIOID DEPENDENCE, INC.
(Oct. 2017), http://www.aatod.org/advocacy/fact-sheets/. .
5 2017 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED
TABLES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION: CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND
QUALITY (Sept. 7, 2018).
6 Opioid Overdose: Drug Overdose Deaths, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2020).
3
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47,600 overdose deaths in 2017, making opioids the main driver
of drug deaths.7
Opioid Use Disorder (OUD) is a mental illness defined
as a “problematic pattern of opioid use leading to clinically
significant impairment or distress.”8 OUD is the “maladaptive
use of opioids, prescribed or illicit, resulting in two or more
criteria that reflect impaired health or function over a twelvemonth period.”9 Withdrawal symptoms, which can include
increased pulse, vomiting, diarrhea, excessive sweating, bone
and joint aches, anxiety, and irritability,10 may begin within four
to six hours of the last opioid use and may last for up to several
months.11 Long-term withdrawal symptoms can occur for much
longer and include anxiety, depression, sleep disturbances,
fatigue, dysphoria, and irritability.12 There is a high likelihood
of relapse after withdrawal.
The criminal justice system is the “largest source of
organizational referrals to addiction treatment;” therefore,
there is a valuable opportunity to facilitate the path to
recovery.13 While 63% of inmates meet the criteria for OUD,14
only a limited percentage of incarcerated individuals with
opioid addiction receive the treatment deemed necessary by
medical professionals: medication-assisted treatment (MAT).15
MAT is a medication treatment that satisfies the chemical
dependence to help the individual refrain from illicit opioid-use
Id.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 5th ed. 541 (2013).
9 Hilary S. Connery, Medication-Assisted Treatment of Opioid Use
Disorder: Review of the Evidence and Future Directions, 23 HARV. REV.
OF PSYCHIATRY 63, 63 (2015).
10 Id.
11 NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE
JAIL-BASED MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT: PROMISING PRACTICES,
GUIDELINES, AND RESOURCES FOR THE FIELD 21 (2018).
12 Ctr. for Substance Abuse Treatment, Protracted Withdrawal, vol. 9
Issue 1 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT ADVISORY (2010).
13NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE,
supra note 11.
14 Id.
15 This Comment refers to MAT concerning treatment for OUD only,
even though it is used as a treatment for other addictions, such as
alcohol and tobacco.
7
8
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while the individual stabilizes the physical and social
dependence to opioid use. MAT includes medications such as
methadone, buprenorphine—neither of which can be abruptly
discontinued16—and naloxone, which are prescribed as part of
a comprehensive treatment plan that includes counseling and
support groups. Once the physical and social dependencies are
stabilized, physicians recommend that the individual ween off
the medication.
Methadone has been used for addiction treatment since
1964 and was approved by the Food and Drug Administration
in 1972.17 It works by activating opioid receptors in the body to
suppress cravings. Typically, only detainees who are already on
methadone at the start of detention may receive a week’s worth
of treatment. Pregnant women, however, are allowed to remain
on treatment until they give birth as MAT helps reduce the
withdrawal effects on a fetus.18 The FDA approved
Buprenorphine in 2002 as a treatment method for OUD.19
Buprenorphine is an “opioid partial agonist” meaning that it
produces effects such as euphoria in low doses.20 These effects
are weaker than other drugs, such as methadone.
Buprenorphine’s effects increase with each dose until it levels
off, which is known as the “ceiling effect.”21 The ceiling effect
lowers the risk of misuse, dependency, and side effects.22
Naloxone is another drug that was approved by the FDA and
works to prevent overdose by blocking opioid receptor sites,

NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE,
supra note 11, at 9.
17 Methadone, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assistedtreatment/treatment/methadone (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
18 German Lopez, How America’s prisons are fueling the opioid epidemic,
VOX. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/3/13/17020002/prison-opioid-epidemic-medicationsaddiction.
19 Buprenorphine, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assistedtreatment/treatment/buprenorphine (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
16
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which reverses the toxic effects of the overdose.23 When
switching from one form of MAT to another, there are specific
guidelines to how much time should lapse to ensure safe
conditions for the recipient.24 Despite being a federally
approved treatment option, fewer than 40 of the 3,200
correctional facilities offer methadone.25 Only five states have
correctional facilities that offer both methadone and
buprenorphine, while only Rhode Island offers all three MAT
options.26
Individuals referred to MAT treatment through the
criminal justice system were less likely to receive treatment
compared to individuals who were referred to treatment
outside of the criminal justice system based on the same
qualifications.27 Only 4.6% of justice-referred people received
treatment while incarcerated when compared to the 40.9% of
individuals referred to MAT treatment through other methods,
such as probation or parole.28 Only 16% of correctional facilities
offer addiction treatment in settings segregated from the
general prison population.29 Approximately 10% of inmates
receive addiction treatment services, while an even smaller
subset receives evidence-based care.30 Correctional facilities do
not want to provide MAT for two primary beliefs: (1) the
provided medications are narcotics, which is something that the
criminal justice system wants to keep out of facilities, and (2)
Naloxone, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assistedtreatment/treatment/naloxone (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
24 NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE,
supra note 11, at 10-11.
25 Christin Vestal, New Momentum for Addiction Treatment Behind Bars,
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2018/04/04/new-momentum-foraddiction-treatment-behind-bars.
26 Id.
27 Noa Krawczyk et.al., Only One in Twenty Justice-Referred Adults in
Specialty Treatment for Opioid Use Receive Methadone or Buprenorphine,
36 Health Aff. 2046, (2017).
28 Id.
29 THE NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE USE AT COLUM.
UNIV., BEHIND BARS II: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON
POPULATION, 4 (2010).
30 Id.
23
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methadone merely substitutes one addiction for another and is
not viewed as a true tool of recovery. However, inmates are at
a higher risk of overdose within the first two weeks of release
from correctional facilities that do not provide MAT.31
The beliefs of the correctional facilities concerning MAT
access are based on stigma. The Constitution, Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the American Bar Association
(ABA) Standards all outline the importance of providing
adequate medication to inmates, while directly rebuking the
misplaced beliefs of the correctional facilities.

PART
II:
CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
I. The Eighth Amendment

AND

STATUTORY

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”32
The Supreme Court began to review prisoner’s medical care
under the Eighth Amendment in the landmark case Estelle v.
Gamble, holding that prisons are required to provide adequate
medical treatment to incarcerated individuals because
incarceration removes an individual’s ability to access
alternative care.33 The Court applied the same ruling to state
prisons through the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Estelle, the plaintiff was injured when a 600-pound bale
of cotton fell on him while unloading a truck during a prison
work assignment.34 After enduring months of pain, prison
guards refused to follow the doctor’s directions, including
altered sleeping arrangements and providing his prescribed
pain medication, claiming that the prescription was lost.35 The
plaintiff was kept in solitary confinement for two months after

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, A Legal Right to Access to
Medications for the Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder in the Criminal
Justice System , Bloomberg Am. Health Initiative (Dec. 2018),
https://americanhealth.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/inlinefiles/AkinGump_Memo_Opioids_121218.pdf.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
33 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
34 Id. at 99.
35 Id.
31
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refusing to work due to the heightened pain.36 While in solitary
confinement, the plaintiff continued to experience severe back
pain, chest pains, high blood pressure, and “blank outs” but
was denied access to the prison doctor on at least two
occasions.37
The Court was hesitant to use the Eighth Amendment to
enforce protections for inmates, noting that “the primary
concern of the drafters was to proscribe tortures and other
barbarous methods of punishment.”38 However, the Court held
that correctional institutions cannot be “deliberately indifferent”
to the “serious medical needs” of individuals within their custody,
since that would contravene the Eighth Amendment’s ban
against cruel and unusual punishment.39 An inmate must rely
on prison authorities to treat his medical needs and, if the
authorities fail to do so, then the needs will not be met.40

a. SERIOUS MEDICAL NEED
In Estelle, the Supreme Court loosely defined “serious
medical need” as “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”
caused by the failure to treat.41 A serious medical need is “one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment
or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”42 The idea of
serious medical need has no formal standard, but it has been
explored by many courts. The First Circuit in Laaman v.
Helgemoe identifies a serious medical need as one that “has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.”43 The Second Circuit in Brock.
v. Wright established three factors: (1) whether a reasonable
Id. at 100 n.5. The plaintiff refers to it as “administrative
segregation,” but the State never specified what that meant;
therefore, the Court of Appeals deemed it the equivalent of solitary
confinement.
37 Id. at 101.
38 Id. at 102.
39 Id. at 104. (emphasis added).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009).
43 Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D. N.H. 1977).
36
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doctor or patient would perceive the medical need in question
as important and worthy of comment or treatment; (2) whether
the medical condition significantly affects daily activities; and
(3) the existence of chronic and substantial pain.44 Lower courts
generally consider three different factors: (1) whether the
condition can be treated; (2) the consequences of foregoing
treatment; and (3) the likelihood of a favorable outcome from
the treatment.45

b. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
The Supreme Court elaborated on the definition of
deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan, holding that a
“prison official may be held liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying human conditions of confinement
only if he knows that inmates face a serious risk of harm and
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it.”46 Thus, deliberate indifference is when a prison official
recklessly disregards a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner
and has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” such that the
failure to treat the serious medical need is cruel.47 “Whether a
prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk
is a question of fact . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a
prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that
the risk was obvious.”48
Many lower courts have followed suit and have defined
deliberate indifference as conduct that is more than mere
negligence, including:
(1) knowledge of a serious medical need and a
failure or refusal to provide care; (2) delaying
treatment for non-medical reasons; (3) grossly
inadequate care; (4) a decision to take an easier
but less efficacious course of treatment; or (5)

Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003).
William J. Rold, Thirty Years After Estelle v. Gamble: A Legal
Retrospective, 14:1 J. OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH Care 11, 16 (2008).
46 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
47 Id. at 834, 836 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)).
48 Id. at 842.
44
45
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medical care that is so cursory as to amount to
no treatment at all.49

Courts agree that “prisoners are guaranteed the right under
the Eighth Amendment to be free from deliberate indifference
by correctional institutions to their serious physical or
psychological needs.”50 However, courts differ on the level of
inadequate care needed to constitute deliberate indifference. A
“simple difference in medical opinion between the medical staff
and an inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of
treatment” does not establish deliberate indifference.51 Courts
avoid second-guessing the professional judgment of a
particular course of treatment or diagnosis52 and have found
that ignoring prior diagnoses and treatment is deliberate
indifference.53 However, courts have consistently held that
denying an inmate treatment for a painful condition based on
non-medical reasons, such as funding, falls within the scope of
deliberate indifference.54 Courts have also held that refusal of
medical attention based on “ease and less efficacious
treatment” rather than the exercise of professional judgment is
deliberate indifference.55
What is clear is that “failure to provide basic psychiatric and
mental health care states a claim of deliberate indifference to the
serious medical needs of prisoners.”56 Courts have interpreted
Estelle to hold that inmates are entitled to psychological or
psychiatric treatment if a physician concludes that the prisoner
has symptoms of a serious disease that could be substantially
alleviated and that denying care could cause the prisoner

Baez v. Rogers, 522 Fed. Appx. 819, 821. (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)).
50 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991).
51 Id.
52 Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).
53 Rivera v. Goord, 119 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
54 See Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986); Dunn v.
Dunn, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1130 (M.D. Ala. 2016); Ancata v. Prison
Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985).
55 See Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970);
McElligot, 182 F.3d at 1248.
56 Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986).
49
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substantial harm.57 Even if there is deliberate indifference, there
must also be a serious medical need for the situation to be
violative of the Eighth Amendment. Both parts of the Eighth
Amendment analysis are inconsistently applied throughout
courts causing uncertainty in treatment modalities for
individuals with OUD. Despite this inconsistent application,
inmates with OUD are still entitled to MAT under the ADA.

II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Although limited, case law has begun to provide people
with OUD protections under the ADA. The ADA defines
disability as a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an]
individual.”58 Physical or mental impairment includes drug
addiction.59 People with OUD suffer from a physical or mental
impairment that limits major life activities including caring for
oneself,
learning,
concentrating,
thinking,
and
communicating.60 OUD also limits the operation of major
bodily functions, such as neurological and brain functions; 61
therefore, OUD is a disability within the ADA’s protections.62
Title II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual with
a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”63 Correctional facilities
constitute a public entity64 which is defined as “any state or
local government; any department [or] agency . . . of a State
or . . . local government,”65 and are clearly subject to the ADA.66
The ADA also states “an individual shall not be denied health
Bowring, 551 F.d at 47; see also Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320
(5th Cir. 1974); Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 313; Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421
F. Supp. 886, 891 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Collins v. Schoofield, 344 F. Supp.
257, 277 (D. Md. 1972).
58 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)
.
59 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(b)(2).
60 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
61 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
62 42 U.S.C. § 12102; 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(b)(2).
63 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
64 Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998).
65 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
66 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211-12.
57
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services, or services provided in connection with drug
rehabilitation, on the basis of the current illegal use of
drugs . . . .”67 To assert a claim under the ADA, an individual
must establish:
(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) that he was excluded from participation in or
denied the benefits of some public entity’s
services, programs, or activities or was
otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that
such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s
disability.68
Under the ADA, a plaintiff can pursue different types of
disability discrimination claims, such as stating that:
(a) the imposition of adverse consequences on a
prisoner based on the prisoner’s disability, (b) a
prison policy that is neutral in its terms, but
impacts prisoners with a disability more
significantly, or (c) the refusal by the prison
administrators to grant the prisoner a reasonable
accommodation so that the prisoner can have
meaningful access to a prison program or
service.69
Under the third option, a “prison program or service” includes
medical services.70 To state a claim, a plaintiff must identify the
disability and the relationship between the disability and policy
on which the discrimination claim is based.
Under the ADA, correctional facilities are clearly
discriminating against inmates. Because individuals diagnosed
with OUD are considered qualified individuals under the ADA,
they must have access to any medically approved treatment
option while under the supervision of a public entity. By not
42 U.S.C. § 12210(c).
Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2019).
69 Wilbur v. Fitzpatrick, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136898 (D. Me. 2018);
see also, Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 144 (1st Cir.
2014).
70 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210.
67
68
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providing MAT to inmates and pretrial detainees who are
diagnosed with OUD, correctional facilities are intentionally
denying health services on the assumption of current illegal
drug use, which violates the ADA. Not providing the
appropriate medication—MAT—causes excessive physical
ailments, of which inmates would not experience if it were not
for the facility’s policy; therefore, the facility imposes adverse
consequences based on the inmate’s disability. To succeed
under the third approach, an individual does not need to show
that other individuals receive more favorable treatment—that
other individuals have access to MAT—but must only show
that they are being denied proper access to a prison program
based on their disability.71 Correctional facilities are failing to
accommodate individuals with OUD by not providing MAT;
therefore denying access to the prison’s medical service.

III. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
The American Bar Association House of Delegates used
constitutional and statutory law, correctional policies and
professional standards, and professional consulting to establish
functional parameters to guide the operation of American
correctional facilities to promote “safety, humaneness, and
effectiveness of our correctional facilities.”72 The purpose of
these Standards is “to shape the institutions of government in
such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution”
and are intended to establish the conditions expected in
confinement facilities.73 The Standards acknowledge Estelle’s
role in setting precedent for the treatment of prisoners, but
further develop the test by stating “what is needed is not care
that barely passes the ‘deliberate indifference’ test, but rather a
standard of care set by reference to the community.”74 The ABA
establishes the Standards based on the idea that there is a
universal belief among correctional facilities, which is “if

Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 274 (2d Cir. 2003).
A.B.A., TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 1 (3d ed. 2011), available at
https://caitlinkellyhenry.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ABAHealth-Care-Treatment_of_Prisoners-2010.pdf.
73 Id. at 5-6.
74 Id. at 150.
71
72
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medical science has determined the appropriate treatment for a
given illness, that treatment is no less appropriate in prison.”75
First, according to the Standards, correctional authorities
should ensure that “a qualified health care professional is
designated the responsible health authority for each facility, to
oversee and direct the provision of health care in that facility”76
because “prisoners should be provided timely access to
appropriately trained and licensed health care staff in a safe and
sanitary setting designed and equipped for diagnosis or
treatment.”77 The qualified medical professional should be
available for inmates suffering from severe pain.78 Having one
qualified medical care professional is not enough to satisfy the
Standards. Correctional facilities should have multiple
qualified medical and mental health professionals at each
facility to provide appropriate health care in a timely manner.79
After a facility has satisfied the need for qualified health
care professionals, a correctional facility “should ensure each
prisoner’s continuity of care, including with respect to medication,
upon entry into the correctional system [and] during
confinement . . . .”80 A prisoner who is found to be “lawfully
taking prescription drugs . . . when they enter a correctional
facility . . . should be maintained on that course of medication
or treatment or its equivalent until a qualified health care
professional directs otherwise . . . .”81 This includes treatment
and habilitation services to prisoners with mental illness or
other cognitive impairments.82 If there are any difficulties with
providing treatment to those with mental illnesses or other
cognitive impairments, “a correctional facility should provide
prisoners . . . appropriate housing assignments and
programming opportunities in accordance with their
diagnoses . . . and treatment or habilitation plans.”83

Id.
Id. at 152.
77 Id. at 153.
78 Id. at 157.
79 Id. at 160.
80 Id. at 163. (emphasis added).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 179.
83 Id. at 180.
75
76
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The ABA Standards clearly outline expectations of medical
treatment within correctional facilities after adopting the
rationale behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle.
Despite these explicit standards, very few states comply.

PART III: CASE REVIEW
I. PRETRIAL DETAINEES
Very few states have addressed MAT access to all
prisoners; however, circuits have addressed MAT access to
pretrial detainees. There are approximately 540,000 pretrial
detainees in correctional facilities.84 Courts distinguish between
convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees because pretrial
detainees can only bring claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment as they are only confined to ensure their presence
at trial.85 Because they have not been found guilty of a crime,
the only rights a pretrial detainee shall lose are those necessarily
lost through the fact of confinement.86 Pretrial confinement
must be consistent with the least restrictive means available to
achieve a valid governmental objective unless further
deprivation is justified through a valid state interest.87 Despite
the constitutional differences between pretrial detainees and
convicted inmates, the legal analysis is similar.88
Furthermore, the reasons cited for keeping MAT out of
correctional facilities—criminal justice system does not want
narcotics in the facilities and methadone is merely an addiction
substitute—have been rejected by many courts, specifically in
the pretrial context. In Norris v. Frame, the court held that
despite there being “no constitutional right to methadone,” the
correctional facility must provide methadone to pretrial
detainee because the defendant demonstrated that he had
regular methadone prescribed to him by a licensed clinic, “that
Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 3.
Cudnik v. Kreiger, 392 F. Supp. 305, 311 (N.D. Ohio 1974); see also
Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2000).
86 Cudnik, 392 F. Supp. at 311.
87 Id.; see also Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978); Norris
v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978).
88 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).
84
85
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this treatment was legal and medically accepted, and the prison
was on notice of these facts.”89 In this case, the correctional
facility could arrange for the transfer of prisoners with drug
problems to a facility where the appropriate treatment was
available; however, the physician determined that it was
unnecessary.90 The court stated that because the defendant was
already receiving the medication in an approved program, the
correctional facility could only refuse to continue treatment if
there was a legitimate interest in doing so, of which the state
did not provide.91 Therefore, the decision to cease treatment
must be left to the authorized methadone facility rather than be
delegated to penal authorities due to their lack of
understanding of OUD.92
Similarly, the court in Cudnik v. Kreiger held that a jail
policy which prohibited dispensing narcotic drugs was
unconstitutional because the plaintiff’s pain, temporary
incapacitation, and loss of liberty did not further the state’s
interest of securing the presence of an individual for trial nor is
it related to advancing jail security.93 The court rejected the
argument that, by allowing methadone access, other inmates
would also seek methadone and similar drugs because the
facility can address that problem if it arises by separating those
receiving MAT treatment from others as they do with men and
women. To use this basis to deny methadone where there are
other means to ensure jail security “would not be consistent
with the least restrictive means of confinement.”94 The court
also rejected the argument that providing methadone to pretrial
detainees would create “an illicit jail market for methadone and
the possibility of theft of the drug”95 on two parts. First, the
court said that physicians or treatment staff may bring the
medication to them daily. Second, the court said that a jail
market for the drug is “unlikely” because methadone can be
administered in liquid form and must be consumed in the
presence of whoever administers the drug.96 The court
Norris, 585 F.2d at 1188.
Id. at 1185.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1189.
93 Cudnik, 392 F. Supp. at 312.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
89
90
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instructed the jail to provide pretrial detainees with methadone
in a secure area of the jail with the appropriate staff so long as
they were receiving methadone treatment prior to
confinement.97

I. CONVICTED INMATES
Courts recognize that pretrial detainees and prisoners
have different liberties while confined. However, courts agree
that methadone should be accessible to those who had a regular
prescription by a physician prior to confinement, that the
treatment must be legal and medically accepted, and that the
prison must be aware of the treatment.98 Courts also agree that
refusal of medication access is only permissible when it furthers
the state’s interest, but an appropriate state interest does not
include fear of an illicit market, the belief that other prisoners
will want drugs or theft.99 These fears have been the sole
reasons why correctional facilities do not provide MAT access
to any type of detainee. However, recent decisions in various
circuits have determined that MAT should be accessible to
convicted inmates as well.

a. COURT CASES
Courts are stuck analyzing situations on a case-by-case
basis and are inconsistently protecting inmate’s constitutional
rights. It is recognized that severe opiate withdrawal symptoms
can amount to a serious medical need;100 however, the Eighth
Id. at 313.
See Norris, 585 F.2d at 1188; Cudnik, 392 F. Supp. at 312; Holly v.
Rapone, 476 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Kirsch v. Racine Cty.
Sheriff, 2008 WL 4872595 (E.D. Wisc. 2008).
99 Id.
100 See Shaver v. Brimfield Twp., 628 Fed. Appx. 378 (6th Cir. 2015);
Foelker v. Outagamie Cty., 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
opiate withdrawal amounts to a serious medical need); Gonzalez v.
Cecil Cty., 221 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616 (D. Md. 2002) (finding heroin
withdrawal is a serious medical need); Hernandez v. Cty. of
Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“withdrawal is a
serious and potentially deadly medical condition, with symptoms
including seizures, hallucinations, agitations and increased blood
pressure”); Pajas v. Cty. of Monterey, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88955, 17
97
98
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Amendment burden of deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need is extremely high and difficult for plaintiffs to
meet.101 For example, in one case, the court held that there was
no severe medical need under the Eighth Amendment when a
defendant was denied methadone despite being unable to sleep
or eat without vomiting for two and a half months after
withdrawing from using five to ten bags of heroin daily.102 In
another case, excessive vomiting did constitute a serious
medical need when an inmate who had used seven bags of
heroin and two bottles of cocaine two days prior; however, the
court determined that there was no deliberate indifference
because he was given Clonidine, Benadryl, and anti-nausea
medication for his withdrawal symptoms.103 The court stated
that deliberate indifference does not include situations in which
medical professionals “should have done more, or done it
differently, or done it better.”104
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (stating drug withdrawal constitutes a serious
medical need requiring appropriate medical care under the Eighth
Amendment); Quatroy v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff's Office, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 40807, 29 (E.D. La. 2009) (“acute symptoms of
withdrawal easily present a serious medical need”); Sirois v. Cichon,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159425, 6 (D.Me. 2013) (concluding that opiate
withdrawal symptoms can arise to the level of an objectively serious
medical need). But see, Iacovangelo v. Corr. Med. Care, Inc., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140679, 10 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that “mild
withdrawal symptoms, such as vomiting, do not necessarily qualify
as an objectively serious medical condition”); Avallone v. Hofmann,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86408, 5 (D.Vt. 2009) (symptoms for two days
“do not generally provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment
claim”).
101 See Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
negligent care from a subarachnoid hemorrhage resulting in
paralysis, disfigurement, loss of ambulatory functions, and severe
hand spasms does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference
under the Eighth Amendment); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (holding that
a prison official cannot be liable under deliberate indifference within
the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate human conditions of
confinement unless they do so knowing that the denial could cause
an excessive risk to inmate health and safety).
102 Alvarado v. Westchester Cty., 22 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
103 Sylvester v. City of Newark, 120 Fed. Appx. 419, 424 (3d Cir.
2005).
104 Id.
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When a prison employee knows that an inmate is
suffering from withdrawal and fails to treat the symptoms105 or
not does not provide appropriate medication, deliberate
indifference can be satisfied.106 For example, an inmate told the
staff that he was a heroin addict who would likely go into
withdrawal without methadone.107 Despite being a heroin
addict, the inmate was refused methadone and given only
Clonidine (a blood pressure medication) as a way to curb
withdrawal symptoms.108 His symptoms were exacerbated as
he became violently ill and was diagnosed with pneumonia
which, due to only receiving an over-the-counter stomach
medication, led to his death.109 The court found that a policy of
refusing appropriate withdrawal treatment “could lead to an
inference of deliberate indifference.”110
Stigma can result in denying methadone, which some
courts consider to be deliberate indifference.111 Despite the jail’s
policy of allowing methadone and the recommendation to give
him a reduced dose, an inmate was denied access to methadone
because he had been off his prescription for three days.112 The
inmate had severe withdrawal symptoms, including defecating
on himself and in his cell, hearing voices, being disoriented, and
believing he was at the “wedding hotel.”113 A registered nurse
in the facility believed that the inmate was “playing the system”
and did not require medical attention. The inmate continued to
Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997).
See Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972) (“a charge of
deliberate indifference by prison authorities to a prisoner’s request
for essential medical treatment is sufficient to state a claim”);
Gonzalez, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (holding that a policy of refusing
meaningful treatment for heroin withdrawal could support a finding
of deliberate indifference).
107 Gonzalez, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 617.
111 See Harper v. Lawrence Cty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“our prior pronouncements on the illegality of delayed or
inadequate treatment for alcohol withdrawal should have sufficed to
put the supervisory Defendants on notice . . . that delayed or
inadequate treatment of alcohol withdrawal would be unlawful”);
Foelker v. Outagamie Cty., 394 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2005).
112 Foelker, 394 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2005).
113 Id. at 511.
105
106
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deteriorate, and the staff transported him to the hospital two
days later.114 The court found that there was a severe medical
need because the inmate had delusions and defecated on
himself. 115 The court stated that “not [being] in extreme distress
does not necessarily mean that [there is not a] serious medical
need.”116 Because “direct evidence is not always necessary to
state a claim” regarding the severity of one’s medical condition,
the court also found that there was deliberate indifference since
the facility knew the inmate had not taken his methadone and
no additional medical attention was provided to the inmate
even after he defecated on himself and in the cell.117 In another
case, two inmates suffered withdrawal symptoms after being
denied methadone.118 Both had their daily vital signs monitored
instead, while one received Tylenol.119 The lower court ruled in
favor of the jail alluding to “the tendency of a drug dependent
person to exaggerate his or her symptoms in order to obtain
drugs.”120 The Fourth Circuit affirmed for security reasons;
however, they did nothing to negate the outrageous stigma that
influenced the lower court’s decision.
Some courts hold tightly onto the idea that, despite there
being an Eighth Amendment analysis to the medical needs of
inmates, there is still no constitutional right to methadone.121
However, other courts have found that there is deliberate
indifference on behalf of the facility when prison officials
“deliberately ignore the express orders of a prisoner’s prior
physician for reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the
prisoner,” and that security concerns are not related to the
medical needs of prisoners.122

Id.
Id. at 513.
116 Id.
117 Id.; see also Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2002)
(refusing to provide medication based on the idea that the
complainant was malingering, not in pain but wanting to get high,
is deliberate indifference).
118 Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31, 31 (4th Cir. 1983).
119 Id. at 32.
120 Id. at 33.
121 Norris, 585 F.2d at 1188; Love v. Thompson, 2016 WL 6991202, 1-5
(W.D. Pa. 2016).
122 Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
Strain v. Sanham, 2009 WL 172898, at 6 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
114
115
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While some facilities may not provide MAT to inmates
with OUD, some facilities do grant access to inmates who use
methadone for pain management. Prison doctors prescribed an
inmate with methadone to treat chronic pain disease resulting
from a spinal injury; however, the new facility to which he was
transferred gave him Tylenol instead, as they had a policy that
prohibited the distribution of narcotics “under [any]
circumstances.”123 The defendants stated that they had no
problem administering methadone for pain management and,
if an inmate had an existing, valid prescription for methadone
for chronic pain, the prescription would be honored subject to
the jail physician’s medical judgment.124 The court ruled in
favor of the inmate because despite meeting all jail criteria, he
was still refused his medication for no valid reason.125
In a similar case, the court ruled in favor of an inmate
when a facility denied access to methadone simply because he
was not housed in the section of inmates who could receive
methadone.126 Instead, the facility provided the inmate with
Tylenol and Naproxen for pain management.127 The court ruled
that this could result in deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need under the Eighth Amendment.128 Other courts
have held similarly when no-narcotics jail policies resulted in
inmates receiving Tylenol for pain instead of their physicianprescribed methadone.129 This clearly demonstrates an issue
Kirsch v. Racine Cty. Sheriff, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91538, 5 (E.D.
Wis.2008).
124 Id. at *7-8.
125 Id.
126 Chess v. Dovey, No. CIV S-07-1767 LKK DAD P, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15835, at *57 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011).
127 Id. at *62.
128 Id. at *64; see also Anderson v. Benton Cty., Nos. 03-6155-TC, 03-806TC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19453 at *19 (D. Or. Sep. 21, 2004) (denying
summary judgment to the defendant after finding that a reasonable
jury could find deliberate indifference after the facility denied an
inmate methadone for pain management despite having a
physician’s prescription).
129 See Franklin v. Dudley, 2:07-cv-2259 FCD KJN P, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 138549, at 6-8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010) (finding evidence of
triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant violated the Eighth
Amendment when the plaintiff was previously prescribed narcotic
pain medication but now was given only over-the-counter
123

380

8 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2020)

under the ADA. When methadone is used for pain
management, courts are more favorable to ensuring inmates
have access when compared to inmates who are using it as a
substance use treatment method, despite both categories of
people having prior physician prescriptions and experiencing
withdrawal symptoms from cessation. Courts have consistently
found that Tylenol instead of methadone is not an appropriate
alternative for pain management but is an appropriate
alternative for substance use withdrawals. It is clear that the
difference lies only with the purpose of the medication and that
those with OUD have an everlasting stigma that inhibits them
from adequate treatment. However, this is beginning to change.
Most recently, the First Circuit in Smith v. Aroostook
County held that Aroostook County Jail must provide MAT to
an inmate under the Eighth Amendment because she faced “an
imminent, painful and dangerous withdrawal and an attendant
risk of continued treatment, overdose, and death.”130 The court
found that (1) the jail’s practice of denying individuals
prescribed MAT is a derivative from the jail, not a medical
decision by Katahdin Valley Health Center (KVHC);131 (2) it is
unclear if KVHC may even be capable of assessing inmates’
needs for MAT, as none of their staff are licensed and one of
their nurses testified that they did not know the standards of
care nor the symptoms of OUD; and (3) the defendants had five
months before the plaintiff was incarcerated to medically assess
her needs for MAT, and they did not do so.132 The First Circuit
also found that the jail violated the ADA by being an
undisputed public entity that denied an undisputed qualified
individual with a disability her necessary medication without
assessing her medical needs or providing any “true

medication such as Tylenol due to the prison’s no-narcotics policy);
Strain, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4760, at *7 (denying summary judgment
after the plaintiff raised the issue that over-the-counter medications,
such as Tylenol, were not appropriate substitutes for Methadone.).
130 Smith v. Aroostook Cty., 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 157 (D. Me. 2019); see
also Smith v. Fitzpatrick, No. 1:18-cv-00288-NT (D. Me. 2018) (finding
a settlement agreement with the Maine Department of Corrections
allowing the plaintiff to receive buprenorphine or an equivalent
medication while incarcerated).
131 KVHC was the medical center with which the jail was contracted
132 Aroostook Cty., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 157.
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justification.”133 Because the jail previously provided MAT to a
pregnant woman in the jail itself without any problems,134 the
court believed that the defendants’ decision to deny MAT
access was not based on a medical assessment but on their
general attitude towards OUD.135 The court found that the
defendants’ representatives “lacked a baseline awareness of
what OUD was despite serving a population that
disproportionately dies of that condition” and the
representatives claimed “learning more about how to treat the
disorder was boring.”136 The court instructed the jail to provide
the plaintiff with her medication in whatever way the
defendants deemed most appropriate for security needs,
including providing the medication in the jail, taking the
plaintiff into the community to receive medication, transferring
her to another facility capable of providing the medication or
“releasing the plaintiff on medical furlough if the jail is
otherwise unable to accommodate her needs.”137
The court in Pesce v. Coppinger also held that under the
Eighth Amendment and the ADA, a correctional facility was
required to provide methadone treatment to an inmate during
his sixty-day incarceration.138 The court found that the
correctional facility’s attempt to require the defendant to
“participate in a treatment program that bares [sic] strong
resemblance to the methods that failed [him] for five years,
including detoxification,”139 would contradict the plaintiff’s
physician’s recommendations, place him at a higher risk of
relapse, and make him physically ill for several days.140 The
court found that the facility’s policy against methadone
treatment does not consider inmates’ specific medical needs
stating “medical decisions that rest on stereotypes about the
disabled rather than ‘an individualized inquiry into the
patient’s condition’ may be considered discriminatory.”141 The
Id. at 158.
Id.
135 Id. at 160.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 162.
138 Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35 (D. Mass. 2018).
139 Id. at 45.
140 Id. at 46.
141 Id. (citing Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274 (1st Cir.
2006)).
133
134
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defendants did not provide any explanation for why they could
not safely and securely administer the medication under the
supervision of medical staff; therefore, the policy is either
“‘arbitrary or capricious-as to imply that it was pretext for some
discriminatory motive’ or ‘discriminatory on its face.’”142 The
court found that the policy implemented by the correctional
facility was a blanket policy and had no indication of whether
it would consider an individual’s medical history and
prescribed treatment; therefore, the facility had “deliberate
indifference to his medical condition.”143
Despite these courts mandating access to MAT on an
individual level, the reasoning applies to inmates with OUD as
a class. In Washington, the American Civil Liberties Union
reached a settlement with Whatcom County Jail in which the
jail must provide MAT to “clinically appropriate [male and
female] inmates who are in withdrawal from opioids as
medically indicated . . . regardless of whether they were already
taking MAT at their time of entry.”144 Prior to this settlement,
buprenorphine was distributed solely to pregnant women with
OUD despite having a policy that states medication services
must be “clinically appropriate and provided in a timely, safe,
and sufficient matter.”145
Individuals are forced to endure excruciating pain
simply because they have a disability. Correctional facilities
resort to a myriad of excuses for not providing MAT; however,
courts consistently reject those. Despite that, the courts have
posed a nearly impossible hurdle of proving both a serious
medical need and a deliberate indifference an individual with
OUD must face to receive legally and medically accepted
medication to treat their disability. MAT is provided to treat
pain for individuals without OUD, and courts reject the
proposition that Tylenol is an acceptable substitute. However,
courts hold the exact opposite when faced with a plaintiff who
Id.
Id.; see also Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F. Supp. 2d 486, 493 (D. Mass.
2012) (“[P]laintiff[s] who allege[] that prison officials repeatedly
ignore[] [a] physician’s recommendations[] [have] stated sufficient
facts to establish an Eighth Amendment violation”).
144 Settlement Agreement at 5, Kortlever et al. v. Whatcom County,
(No. 2:18-cv-00823).
145 Complaint by Petitioner at 11, Kortlever et al. v. Whatcom
County, (No. 2:18-cv-00823).
142
143
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has OUD. It is clear that the stigma associated with illicit
substances runs deeper than the illegal substance itself, but also
affects individuals who are on a legally and medically accepted
regiment. Despite the courts’ inconsistency, states have begun
protecting these individuals.

b. State Initiative
Whether by case law or legislation, states are beginning
to act. Many individual states have created programs to target
recidivism rates and to combat overdose and death. The states
themselves are not concerned with the security reasons quoted
by correctional facilities, as these are considered inappropriate
bars to medication access by the courts. When jail-based state
programs have encountered security issues, such as those in
Rhode Island, they have been addressed with little issue.
Two model states have implemented successful
programs—New York and Rhode Island. In 1987, New York
became the first state to initiate a methadone treatment
program for incarcerated opiate-dependent inmates.146 The Key
Extended Entry Program (KEEP) has two components; the first
being jail-based in Rikers Island Correctional Facility147 and the
second being community-based.148 KEEP has two withdrawal
protocols: heroin withdrawal involves twelve days of tapering
methadone, and methadone withdrawal involves tapering
based on the community dosage.149 To be eligible for KEEP,
inmates must receive a sentence of one year or less or pretrial
detainees who face a possible sentence of one year or less.
Anyone who has a sentence of more than one year is not eligible
for KEEP.150 Once an inmate or pretrial detainee begins the
program, they undergo specific medication distribution
protocols and psychoeducation.151 The medication distribution
protocols include the direct observation therapy (DOT)

Vincent Tomasino, et al., The Key Extended Entry Program (KEEP):
A Methadone Treatment Program for Opiate-Dependent Inmates, 68
MOUNT SINAI J. OF MEDICINE, 14 (Jan. 2001).
147 Hereinafter “Rikers.”
148 Tomasino, supra note 146, at 14.
149 Id. at 15.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 16.
146
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method.152 With this method, inmates are observed taking the
medication and must verbally respond to a question asked by
the correction officer to insure ingestion. The DOT method has
significantly
decreased
drug
diversion.153
Through
psychoeducation, inmates and pretrial detainees regularly meet
with counselors to discuss dose maintenance and treatment
issues.154 KEEP also offers relapse prevention through
individual and group counseling in which inmates and pretrial
detainees “identify triggers to relapse and identify methods of
dealing with those triggers.”155 KEEP participants may also
receive alternatives to incarceration, such as residential and
outpatient programs, if drug treatment is determined to be
more effective than incarceration.156 KEEP statistics show that
individuals who receive a higher post-release dose of MAT are
more likely to continue reporting to their designated
community-based organization because individuals must
“achieve a true ‘blocking dose’ in order to remain in treatment
and to eliminate the craving for heroin.”157
While KEEP has exhibited success in decreasing
recidivism and managing substance abuse to avoid overdose,
issues have begun to rise as Rikers is being shut down and
inmates in KEEP are being relocated throughout the state.
These inmates were being tapered off their medication in
preparation for their transfer; however, the issue for these
inmates still persists.158 As of July 1st, a new program allows
inmates who were transferred to Elmira prison to receive
methadone, making this the first program to allow MAT in
New York state prisons.159 This allows inmates who were
transferred from Rikers to Elmira to continue methadone,
rather than undergo tapering protocols, but only if their
sentence is for two years or less.160 Elmira had no licensed
Id.
Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 17.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 18.
158 Alison Knopf, Methadone Now Allowed in Upstate NY Prison, If
Inmates Come from Rikers OTP First, ADDICTION TREATMENT FORUM
(Aug. 7, 2019).
159 Id.
160 Id.
152
153
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physician to dispense MAT; however, they partnered with
United Health Services and the Opioid Treatment Program who
send licensed physicians to the Elmira facility weekly to
distribute the medication.161 As of right now, only the
medication will be provided in the Elmira facility—no
counseling or other services will be provided—however, this is
a crucial start to maintaining treatment compliance with these
individuals and piloting a program for other state facilities to
follow.162
To further this program, the Senate passed a bill to
establish a MAT program for state and county correctional
facilities, which would create a substance abuse treatment
program in each state and county correctional facility.163 The
program would be similar to KEEP in that inmates and pretrial
detainees will be screened for OUD and provided one of the
three MAT options approved by the FDA.164 Individuals will
then work with a specialist to determine an individualized
biopsychosocial treatment plan, including counseling. Per the
bill, the only individual who can adjust the dosage, commence
or cease MAT is a licensed physician.165 The bill also creates a
re-entry program to inmates who receive MAT while
incarcerated that includes resources for local treatment
facilities, housing, employment, and other information that will
assist an inmate in continuing recovery once released.166
In 2016, the Rhode Island Legislature approved a $2
million annual budget to expand MAT programs in prisons as
part of a fully federally-regulated opioid treatment program.167
Since then, Rhode Island is the only state that offers all three
primary MAT options to inmates, regardless of whether they
are pretrial detainees or convicted inmates, in all Rhode Island
Department of Corrections (RIDOC) facilities. Currently,
Id.
Id.
163 S. 2161B, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2019) (as of Feb. 27,
2020, the bill has been advanced for a third reading in the Senate).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Nicole Beckman, Hanna Bliska, & Eliza Jane Schaeffer, Medication
Assisted Treatment Programs in Vermont State Correctional Facilities:
Evaluating H.468 through a State by State Comparison, THE NELSON A.
ROCKEFELLER CENTER AT DARTMOUTH C. (Feb. 22, 2018).
161
162
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approximately 300 inmates receive MAT every day.168 The MAT
program is run by Comprehensive Health Care, Centered on
You (CODAC) Behavioral Healthcare and includes creating a
re-entry treatment plan prior to release that includes various
recovery services such as primary care physicians, specialty
physicians, specialized healthcare needs, housing, education,
transportation, mental health services, and legal support.169
Upon entering the facility, inmates are screened by CODAC
physicians for OUD and are given the option to continue
treatment for up to a year or, if they had not previously received
treatment and screen positive, they may opt in to receive
treatment for a year, so long as their sentence is a year or less.170
After opting in to MAT, inmates must complete a
biopsychosocial assessment by a CODAC physician, who then
creates a treatment plan, as well as manages doses.171 The
RIDOC requires that inmates receiving MAT participate in
behavioral health groups run by CODAC, as well as individual
therapy if deemed necessary. To combat security issues with
drug diversion, RIDOC switched from pill medication to strips,
such as buprenorphine strips, which melt on the tongue. Since
this switch, the black market for drugs is waning.172
Vermont implemented a MAT program as a result of a
court decision and bad press. In 1999, Keith Griggs was charged
with forgery and entered into a plea agreement that allowed
him to enter into furlough so he could continue taking his
methadone.173 In 2001, the Vermont Department of Corrections
(VDOC) suspended his furlough for two weeks and refused to
provide methadone, causing abrupt withdrawal. The Vermont
Supreme Court affirmed the decision that he was entitled to his
medication; however, the jail released him early rather than
provide his medication.174 The same situation happened to
Id.
Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Alicia Freese, How Drug Treatment Policies in Vermont Prisons
Contribute to the Opiate Crisis, SEVEN DAYS (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/how-drug-treatmentpolicies-in-vermont-prisons-contribute-to-the-opiatecrisis/Content?oid=9714430.
174 Id.
168
169
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Shawn Gibson, who was denied methadone access while
incarcerated, forcing him to undergo abrupt withdrawal.175
These cases highlight the controversy over OUD in
many states, while also highlighting the power of media
coverage. Although the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that
inmates must have access to MAT while incarcerated,
correctional facilities were still denying MAT access. As a result
of web articles discussing the lack of MAT access in correctional
facilities, the VDOC adopted a year pilot program, which
allowed inmates to receive MAT for a year of their incarceration
sentence.176 However, the application of the program only
provided ninety days of MAT access and approval for MAT
access is highly selective, leaving many inmates with
terminated treatment plans and prescriptions.177 The
correctional facilities terminate MAT access for three reasons:
(1) expected length of stay exceeds thirty days, (2) the
individual was seen or is suspected of diverting drugs,178 and
(3) the urine test turned up another illicit drug that is not
marijuana.179
Similar to Rhode Island, VDOC has taken precautions to
decrease drug diversion. For example, inmates must wear
certain clothes that do not have pockets when getting their
medication.180 This raises issues with other inmates who want
the medication because they are then better able to identify
those who are receiving the medication, which causes targeting.
Some inmates divert drugs because the doses are so low that
they are going through withdrawal before their next dose.181
The jail claims that using illicit drugs with MAT can cause a
health and safety risk.182 However, medical professionals
disagree that it is enough of a health and safety risk to constitute
Id.
Id.
177 Id.
178 This includes diversions of drugs on previous stays.
179 Freese, supra note 173.
180 Alicia Freese, Hundreds of Vermont Prisoners Get Addiction Meds,
but Challenges Remain, SEVEN DAYS (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/hundreds-of-vermontprisoners-get-addiction-meds-but-challengesremain/Content?oid=24280732.
181 Id.
182 Freese, supra note 173.
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ceasing treatment because the alternative is worse. Jails also
view methadone and other MAT methods as a privilege and
provide alternatives to managing withdrawal symptoms.183
Jails frequently receive complaints that these alternatives do not
subside the withdrawal symptoms enough to make them
manageable; however, the jail administration views it as
“patients being upset that their medication wasn’t
continued.”184 After another web article was published
highlighting the personal stories of inmates who underwent
excruciating withdrawal symptoms after being denied access or
abruptly taken off medication rather than tapered, the VDOC
expanded treatment from 30 days to 120 days.185
In 2018, Vermont Lawmakers voted to make opioid
treatment widely available in correctional facilities. The new
law allowed inmates to receive MAT for more than 120 days if
necessary, as well as allowed inmates to get a prescription while
in prison, rather than limiting treatment to inmates who
received MAT prior to incarceration.186 Under the new law,
inmates must be medically assessed within fourteen days of
incarceration. If at any point an inmate is no longer deemed
medically necessary to continue MAT, only a licensed medical
physician may discontinue MAT.187
Other states have also taken the initiative to implement
MAT policies without waiting for court decisions. In 2015, New
Hampshire implemented a policy that provides MAT to
inmates while they are incarcerated and before release.188
However, they may only receive medication after they
complete six months of behavioral, educational, and counseling
treatment components.189 Upon release, inmates are mandated
These alternatives include clonidine for anxiety and muscle aches;
hydroxyzine for nausea and vomiting; Imodium for diarrhea and
Tylenol for general pain.
184 Tomasino, supra note 146.
185 Alicia Freese, Vermont Lawmakers Vote to Make Opioid Treatment
Widely Available in Prison, SEVEN DAYS (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/archives/2018/04/26
/vermont-lawmakers-vote-to-make-opioid-treatment-widelyavailable-in-prison.
186 S. 166, No. 176, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018).
187 Id.
188 Beckman, Bliska, & Schaeffer, supra note 167.
189 Id.
183
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to follow up with a licensed alcohol and drug counselor to
ensure successful re-entry and treatment compliance.190 While
this policy protects inmates from overdosing upon release, it
still does not protect inmates under the Eighth Amendment and
ADA because inmates are forced to experience the same
withdrawal symptoms.
Missouri has implemented a policy that provides an
incentive to participating inmates. After being screened and
referred to the program, inmates are granted a reduction in
sentence time if they cooperate with MAT, which has increased
program participation and decreased recidivism.191 Upon
release, inmates receive a different form of MAT, Vivitrol,192
and receive consistent one-on-one interaction with a postrelease caseworker to ensure that individuals are maintaining
sobriety and complying with treatment recommendations.193
The flaw in Missouri’s plan is that inmates can only be referred
to enter substance abuse treatment by the court or by the Board
of Probation and Parole.194
There has been movement in Congress as well. The Senate
proposed the Community Re-Entry through Addiction
Treatment to Enhance (CREATE) Opportunities Act, which
would “establish a grant program to provide more MAT
options while incarcerated and continued access to care upon
release.”195 This Senate bill has a House companion bill that
would create a grant program to allow states and local
government to “develop, implement, or expand programs to
provide MAT in prisons and jails.”196 The companion bill would
Id.
Id.
192 Vivitrol blocks opioid receptors in the brain so opioid
consumption does not result in addiction-reinforcing euphoria. This
is typically not a common MAT option in correctional facilities
because it does not subdue the withdrawal symptoms like
methadone, naloxone, and buprenorphine.
193 Beckman, Bliska, & Schaeffer, supra note 167.
194 Id.
195 CREATE Opportunities Act, S. 1983, 116th Cong. (2019) (as of
June 16, 2019, the bill has been referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary).
196 CREATE Opportunities Act, H.R. 3496, 116t Cong. (2019) (as of
July 30, 2019, the bill has been referred to the subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security).
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also make more medications available, require staff to be
appropriately trained in addiction services, and address the
increased risk of overdose by connecting individuals to
continued MAT treatment upon release from incarceration.
State and federal governments have realized that reliance
on the court is moot; therefore, they are working to recognize
and address the needs of individuals with OUD to ensure
individual success. While there may be legislative action, there
are other routes correctional facilities and states as a whole can
pursue.

PART IV: SOLUTIONS
The ABA provides clear guidelines as to how inmates
should receive medical treatment. Correctional facilities
continue to try and provide medication such as Tylenol,
Clonidine, and Naproxen instead of MAT out of fear of
diversion and introducing narcotics into facilities; however, this
violates ABA Standards. Because correctional facilities are not
providing adequate treatment and are outright refusing
services that are related to drug rehabilitation, the ADA is also
violated. By not providing them the adequate medication,
inmates are undergoing excruciating pain, thus correctional
facilities are also violating the Eighth Amendment by having
deliberate indifference to the serious medical harm and are not
considering individuals on a case-by-case basis. Only when
MAT access is constitutionally protected will these hurdles be
overcome. This can only be achievable once courts (1)
acknowledge the bad precedent upon which many are relying;
(2) adopt bright-line definitions; and (3) mandate that relevant
policies be decided by the appropriate professionals.

I. FAULTY RELIANCE ON BAD PRECEDENT
Despite the favorable holding in Norris v. Frame, many
courts heavily rely on its statement that there is no
constitutional right to methadone.197 This reliance is extremely
flawed for two reasons. First, Norris v. Frame determined a lack
of constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause because the plaintiffs were pretrial detainees and
197

Norris, 585 F.2d at 1188.
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were not granted rights under the Eighth Amendment.198
However, that court still found in favor of the plaintiff under
the Due Process Clause because the correctional facility refused
to review his needs on an individualized basis.199 Courts should
not rely so heavily on a singular dictum statement. Instead,
courts should be following the constitutionally mandated test
under the Eighth Amendment. In addition to outlining the
serious medical need and deliberate indifference prongs to the
Eighth Amendment, the court in Estelle found that the
obligation to provide medical care to inmates extends to both
situations in which the denial “may actually produce physical
torture or a lingering death” and those in which “denial of
medical care may result in pain and suffering with which no
one suggests would serve any penological purpose.”200
Excessive pain, vomiting, uncontrollable defecation, and
hallucinations are only some of the symptoms of withdrawal
from opioids and MAT. By denying MAT, correctional facilities
are knowingly inducing these symptoms, none of which are
symptoms that a rational person would believe serves any
penological purpose; therefore, it is a blatant violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, because courts have
determined that inmates have a constitutional right under the
Eighth Amendment to psychiatric and psychological
medication to alleviate symptoms of a serious disease if denial
of such treatment would cause substantial harm to the
inmate,201 inmates should undoubtedly already have access to
MAT. MAT is an FDA-approved treatment for OUD that is
intended to alleviate the harsh symptoms and denial of
treatment can result in substantial harm and even death.
Inmates are forced to rely on correctional facilities to treat their
medical needs;202 however, doctors cannot act on their duty to
properly treat their patients if the medication is not even an
option.
Second, Norris v. Frame relied on an FDA regulation203 with
no specification as to how the FDA regulation denied
constitutional rights to methadone. The FDA regulation in
Id. at 1185, 1187.
Id. at 1188-89.
200 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
201 Bowring, 551 F.2d at 43.
202 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
203 21 C.F.R. § 310.505 (reserved Jan. 8, 2007).
198
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question outlines methadone treatment programs, including
“maintenance treatment” programs which are medical services
that provide “stable dosage levels for a period in excess of 21
days as an oral substitute for heroin or other morphine-like
drugs, for an individual dependent on heroin.”204 Because
inmates would receive MAT for more than twenty-one days,
correctional facilities would constitute maintenance treatment
programs. The FDA regulation then describes how methadone
dosage should be determined based on the symptoms that each
individual exhibits.205 The FDA regulations cited by Norris
neither explicitly nor implicitly state that an inmate does not
have a right to MAT. The same definitions and criteria are
applicable today under Federal Public Health regulations.206
The misinterpretation of the regulations, as well as the faulty
reliance on bad precedent, are blocking individuals from
receiving appropriate medical treatment for a disability.

II. ADEQUATE DEFINITIONS
The Eighth Amendment analysis under Estelle includes
phrases such as “serious medical need” and “deliberate
indifference” but there is little help defining such terms, which
results in inconsistent constitutional protection. There is no
consistent test to determine whether a physical ailment
constitutes a serious medical need. Under the current guidance,
some courts have interpreted excessive vomiting to constitute a
serious medical need, while others say it is not sufficient. This
lack of clarity allows correctional facilities to deny medical
treatment under any façade they choose, opening the door for
increased discrimination. Additionally, courts and correctional
facilities are both demonstrating discriminatory behaviors by
inconsistently analyzing deliberate indifference. Courts have
found the use of Tylenol instead of methadone can constitute a
deliberate indifference in regard to pain management but is
perfectly acceptable in regard to treating OUD. This
inconsistency is a clear demonstration of the court’s stigma
towards individuals with OUD. Ignoring prior diagnoses,207

21 C.F.R. § 310.505(a)(2).
21 C.F.R. § 310.505(d)(6)(c).
206 42 C.F.R. § 8.12(e)(1) (2016).
207 Rivera, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
204
205

RESOLVINGTHEOVERLOOKEDTRAGEDYINCORRECTIONALFACILITIES 393
denying medication for non-medical reasons,208 and choosing a
treatment method that is easier and less effective209 are all
recognized methods of satisfying deliberate indifference, yet
correctional facilities continue to escape liability when denying
medication for these exact reasons because there is no
consistency among courts. For this two-part test to be applied
consistently and fairly, there must be a clear definition written
into a binding agent.

III. FACILITY POLICIES
Correctional facilities do not need to wait for court and
legislative decisions. They may begin prioritizing the needs of
the underserved by reviewing their policies surrounding MAT.
These policies should shift the responsibility of medical
decisions to qualified individuals, address the necessary
concerns within the facility, and implement effective MAT
programming.

a. PHYSICIANS AS DECISIONMAKERS
The ABA Standards has reviewed all necessary
constitutional and statutory provisions as well as case law and
has determined that there should be a standard of care,210 which
includes leaving all medical decisions to a qualified health
professional, adopting treatment that is medically accepted,
ensuring an inmate’s continuity of care upon entrance into a
facility.
There is a trend towards giving deference to medical
professionals when determining access to MAT; however, this
is not moving fast enough. Currently, jail administrators are
deciding to cease MAT before consulting with a physician,
simply because they believe that providing MAT will cause
security issues and that MAT is replacing one addiction with
another. This contrasts with the ABA Standards, which were
developed based on the idea that there is a universal belief
among correctional facilities and that universal belief includes
See Jones, 781 F.2d at 771; Dunn, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Ancata,
769 F.2d at 704.
209 See Williams, 508 F.2d at 544; McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864; McElligot, 182
F.3d at 1248.
210 Supra note 72, at 150.
208
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trusting “a qualified health care professional . . . to oversee and
direct the provision of health care in that facility.”211 OUD is a
medical concern and should be addressed only by a licensed
physician, rather than by uninformed and uninterested jail
administrators. Despite courts placing the decision on the jail
administrators, states are following the recommendation of the
ABA Standards by putting the power into the hands of the
physicians. The bills passed by individual states explicitly state
that medical decisions regarding dosage, commencement, and
discontinuation of MAT should only be done by a licensed
physician. These state bills are forcing correctional facilities to
comply with the ADA by first assessing an inmate’s or pretrial
detainee’s medical needs before determining the appropriate
treatment.
As the ABA Standards suggest, the physicians should
create one distinct policy that is applicable to all correctional
facilities to both inmates and pretrial detainees. As it stands, in
many cases, a difference among physician opinions can keep
inmates from receiving MAT; however, courts do not consider
this deliberate indifference.212 Furthermore, inmates cannot
pass the deliberate indifference hurdle if there is no specific
policy implemented by the facility that denies access to
methadone.213 Courts seem to approve of facilities with a caseby-case MAT screening system and object to facilities that have
a blanket no-narcotics policy. However, this creates a path for
facilities to claim they have a case-by-case screening system,
such as that in
Aroostook County,214 and still deny everyone
anyway. By making MAT access constitutional, and creating a
blanket policy for all correctional facilities, these issues will be
eradicated, and every inmate, administrator, and physician will
have a clear expectation regardless of national location.
The blanket policy should also consider the appropriate
alternative medications. Many correctional facilities provide
Id. at 152.
See Wood v. Chadwick, No. 5:10-CT-3039-D, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59070 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 26, 2012).
213 See Womack v. Windsor, No. 2:15-cv-0533 MCE KJN P, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21922 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018) (finding that denial of
methadone for pain management would constitute deliberate
indifference if the jail had an explicit policy that denied the
medication).
214 376 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D. Me. 2019).
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Tylenol, Clonidine, Naproxen, and other medications because
there is no consistent medically approved alternative. These
medications should only be used when an inmate opts out of
using MAT or has any other aversion to its use, such as an
allergy. In no way should these alternative medications be used
as a way for facilities to not provide the proposed
constitutionally mandated MAT. It is also important that the
physicians who make these policies be unaffiliated with
correctional facilities in an attempt to diminish the risk that
doctors will determine detainees ineligible for MAT due to
facility influence.
The ABA Standards also reinforce the assurance that
there must be a continuity of care once an inmate enters a
facility.215 By creating a constitutional protection, individuals
will be able to continue on their prescribed treatment modality
until they are evaluated by a licensed professional, who may
then determine if there is a continued need. Creating a
constitutional protection to MAT will not provide MAT to
everyone who steps foot into a correctional facility. The
constitutional mandate will, however, ensure that people have
access to safe and FDA-approved medication to treat their
disabilities. MAT recipients can still be evaluated by physicians
at any point during treatment and removed from medication if
a trained physician deems it no longer necessary. The inverse is
true in that people may be re-eligible for it at another point in
their journey to recovery. A constitutional protection for MAT
will not increase the worries of correctional facilities, as there
are ample ways to address these concerns.

b. ADDRESS CONCERNS WITHIN FACILITIES
Correctional facilities cite drug diversion as a core
reason why MAT should not be provided in facilities; however,
there are ample successful alternatives—medicine strips that
melt in one’s mouth,216 liquid medication, injections, having the
inmate answer questions during medication distribution to
ensure consumption, and even separating MAT recipients from
other inmates. Vermont makes inmates who receive MAT to
wear clothes without pockets; however, this creates an issue
Supra note 72, at 180.
This is the method used by RIDOC to address this specific
concern.
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216
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because recipients are more likely to be targeted by drugseeking inmates. Therefore, this should only be used if MAT
recipients are already separated from other inmates.
Proper education and preparation are vital in ensuring
that MAT is not diverted. By not offering MAT, correctional
facilities are inadvertently promoting diversion from inmates
with OUD who would benefit from MAT treatment.217
Medication must be counted, recorded, and stored in locked
cabinets. The administration of medication should take a few
minutes and recipients must be closely observed. If diversion
remains a concern, regular drug screens can be used to check
inmates for abnormal levels. Most importantly, MAT should
never be taken away as part of a punishment. That would be
like taking away diabetes or heart disease medication. Knowing
that excruciating withdrawal symptoms would result by taking
away MAT medication simply for “bad” behavior borders on
torture. Furthermore, forced detoxification from medication
can undermine an individual’s willingness to engage in MAT
in the future which compromises the likelihood of long-term
recovery.218 To determine the most appropriate methods for
addressing concerns, correctional facilities could resort to
programming resources219 or look to states with successful
programs.

c. EFFECTIVE PROGRAMMING
Some states, such as Vermont, have programs in place
that provide MAT prior to release, but not upon entrance into a
correctional facility. While providing MAT before release is
important to decrease the risk of overdose once in the
community, it does not address the withdrawal symptoms
inmates experience upon entering a correctional facility;
NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE,
supra note 11, at 17.
218 NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE,
supra note 11, at 21.
219 See Evidence-Based Resource Guide Series: Use of Medication-Assisted
Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder in Criminal Justice Settings,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., 67 (July 2019)
(providing multiple training videos, fact sheets, guidelines, and
other resources for correctional facilities to create a successful MAT
treatment program).
217
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therefore, it is still in violation of the ADA and the Eighth
Amendment. These programs do not medically assess
individuals before determining their medical needs and they
force inmates to undergo excruciating withdrawal symptoms.
The ideal nationally implemented program would reflect
similarities in programs such as the one implemented in Rhode
Island which provides MAT upon entrance for up to a year and
ninety days prior to release. This complies with both the ADA
and the Eighth Amendment because it allows individuals to be
treated for their medical needs and alleviates withdrawal
symptoms, making it a more effective program for treatment
and successful release. Furthermore, the ABA Standards used
Estelle to determine that an inmate “who is lawfully taking
prescription drugs . . . should be maintained on that course of
medication . . . .”220 Screening should be routine to ensure that
the appropriate medication and dosage is being administered.
President Trump reports an amplitude of support to identifying
and treating offenders in the criminal justice system who have
OUD, including screening every federal inmate for OUD upon
intake.221 This should not only include federal inmates. OUD
screening must include all levels of detainees with prior
diagnoses and others who may meet the criteria. Despite
suggestions under the ADA, simply being a “prior user” before
incarceration does not inhibit them from ADA and Eighth
Amendment protections.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court said that a remedy for unsafe
conditions need not await a tragedy.222 However, tragedies are
occurring daily as individuals with a disability are being denied
their medically accepted medication and being forced to endure
excruciating pain, and sometimes death, with little to no
reprieve. How severe must the tragedy be before courts,
correctional facilities, and legislators see that these individuals
Supra note 72, at 163.
President Donald J. Trump’s Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse and
Reduce Drug Supply and Demand, HEALTHCARE (Oct 24, 2018)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presidentdonald-j-trumps-initiative-stop-opioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supplydemand-2/.
222 Helling, 609 U.S. at 33.
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deserve to be viewed as valuable rather than disposable? These
decisions to deny access to MAT affect the lives of thousands of
Americans. Correctional facilities are choosing to ignore
decades of scientific evidence, as well as the successful
programs implemented in Riker’s Island, Rhode Island, and
other jurisdictions, all of which illustrate the success of MAT
access and the capability of facilities throughout the country.
It is well known that the correctional system is flawed
and that individuals with a history of substance use are
disproportionately affected. Correctional facilities cannot
continue to hide behind the façade of safety and security,
because their unconstitutional methods are having the exact
opposite effect. Denial of MAT to qualified individuals is a
violation of both the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment because it is a deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need and Title II of the ADA for denying a
qualified individual access to a public entity’s service based on
a disability. The ample guidelines available for correctional
facility administrators to follow leave no more room for
excuses. It is time for the blatant discrimination to cease.

